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Background and Objectives: Following from previous work in which post-encoding suggestions 
of threat led to the development of a memory bias (in the presumed absence of an attentional 
bias; Senn & Radomsky, 2012), we sought to examine whether the development of a similar 
threat-relevant memory bias could be fostered via a purely informational pathway.  
Methods: A vignette about a classroom interaction was read aloud to (n = 96) undergraduate 
participants who then completed a post-encoding recall test. Participants were then told that the 
experimenter forgot to read the last sentence of the vignette, and were then randomly assigned 
either to the Threat condition, in which the additional statement indicated that a character in the 
vignette had a highly contagious flu, or to the No-Threat condition, in which the additional 
statement indicated that a character in the vignette had been accepted to graduate school. A 
second recall test was then administered.  
Results: Participants in the Threat condition (but not those in the No-Threat condition) 
demonstrated a proportional memory bias in favour of threatening information. This bias was not 
evident at the initial recall test.  
Limitations: Time spent engaging in active recall was not assessed.  Also, although the study was 
designed to minimize demand characteristics, it is possible that these played a role. 
Conclusions: An explicit memory bias for threat can be created through informational means 
alone, even when no threat was present at encoding. Results are discussed in terms of pathways 
to fear and of cognitive approaches to understanding and treating anxiety disorders. 
 





An informational pathway to the development of a contamination-related memory bias 
 
Theories involving emotion and cognition posit that attention, interpretation and memory 
are biased toward emotionally-relevant content, particularly when such content is personally 
significant or meaningful (Bower, 1981; Kovacs & Beck, 1978; Radomsky & Rachman, 2004). 
Research on memorial biases in association with anxious arousal and/or anxious 
psychopathology is inconclusive (see Coles & Heimberg, 2002, and Mitte, 2008 for reviews). 
Most studies failing to detect a memory bias employed methods based in traditional cognitive 
science research (e.g., learn, and then later recall lists of words) and/or stimuli which were low in 
ecological validity (e.g., word list learning). The failure to detect explicit memory biases in 
association with anxiety led to other theories which attempted to explain this in the context of 
well-demonstrated attentional biases, by highlighting differences between the activation of 
cognitive structures and their recollection (e.g., Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1987). 
 A number of researchers took a more ecologically valid approach to studying memory in 
association with anxious arousal employing contaminated objects (Radomsky & Rachman, 
1999), threatening objects (Tolin et al., 2001), objects which were the subject of extant repeated 
checking by study participants (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001), internal physiological 
sensations among those concerned about social evaluation/social performance (Ashbaugh & 
Radomsky, 2009, 2011; Mansell & Clark, 1999) and on the whole, were better able to detect the 
memory biases proposed by earlier theorists. A number of reviews of the literature have 
concluded that explicit memory biases for threat/in association with anxious arousal are present 




 In virtually all of these studies, stimuli designed to convey threat (contrasted against 
those designed to be neutral) were encoded during an early part of the study, and participants 
were later asked to recall, recognize and/or otherwise remember these stimuli. This approach is 
entirely consistent with attempts to understand the role(s) that cognition (including memory) 
might play in the maintenance of anxious psychopathology; unfortunately, it lends itself to a 
rather important limitation. Namely, it is impossible to determine whether any observed bias in 
recall or recollection is simply the result of biases in attention. That is, if participants are known 
to allocate preferential attentional resources to threatening stimuli (during encoding, for 
example), it would not be surprising if such stimuli were better remembered (during retrieval). 
Indeed, recent work in depression has shown that attentional biases can cause memory biases 
(Blaut, et al., 2013). Further, although consistent with approaches to understanding the 
maintenance of anxiety-related problems, this methodology does not lend itself well to questions 
and constructs related to the development or onset of anxiety-related problems. 
Recently, we demonstrated that a memory bias could be detected following a 
combination of direct experience and information in the absence of attentional bias at encoding 
(Senn & Radomsky, 2012). Undergraduate participants were asked to interact with a series of 30 
neutral objects displayed in two boxes. Following a baseline recall test, participants were 
randomly assigned to the threat condition (in which they were told that one box was used to hold 
a tarantula while its terrarium was cleaned; the live tarantula was shown to participants during 
this manipulation), or the control condition (in which they were told that one box was used to 
hold the laboratory’s printer paper; the paper was shown to participants during this 
manipulation). Importantly, the other (unmanipulated) box was described across both conditions 
as in use for the study only. A second free recall test was then administered. Results showed a 
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significantly greater proportion of spider box to unmanipulated box items recalled compared to 
the proportion of paper box to unmanipulated box items recalled. This difference was not evident 
at baseline. To our knowledge, this was the first study to demonstrate a memory bias for threat in 
the presumed absence of an attentional bias (indeed, although attention was not assessed, all 
objects were neutral at encoding, as no threatening information – or spiders were introduced until 
after encoding). Further, the experiment demonstrated how such biases might form, in this case 
through a combination of direct experience (with a live tarantula) and information (connecting 
the tarantula to some of the objects with which participants had previously interacted). (These 
results are also consistent with false memory research, where information provided at a later time 
is integrated with old information to create a new comprehensive memory (e.g., McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985)). 
We propose that consistent with pathways to the development of fear in humans (i.e., 
direct conditioning, vicarious conditioning, information, and prepared) described by Rachman 
(1977), there should be similar pathways to the development of memory bias in association with 
threat/anxiety. The goal of the present study was to assess a purely informational pathway (i.e., 
without direct experience) to a contamination-related memory bias via a vignette-based 
experiment. We hypothesized that when provided with threatening information about some of 
the previously encoded material, participants would display a proportionate memory bias 
compared to those provided with neutral information about previously encoded material. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were (n = 96) undergraduate students who participated either for course 
credit or entry in a cash draw. Participants were on average 21.73 (SD = 5.63) years of age and 
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the majority (81.2%) were female. There were no age (t(94) = 0.99, p = .33) or sex (χ2(1) = 0.01, 
p = .92) differences between the two conditions (see below). 
Measures 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) and Beck Depression Inventory-2 
(BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BAI and BDI-II are both well used 21-item 
questionnaires that assess symptoms of anxiety and depression respectively. In the current study, 
internal consistencies of these scales were α’s= .91 and .90, respectively. 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004). The 
VOCI is a 55-item questionnaire assessing a range of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, including 
a contamination subscale. The scale has high test-retest reliability (0.91), and internal 
consistency (α = 0.96; Radomsky et al., 2006). Convergent and divergent validity are excellent 
(Thordarson et al., 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006). Internal consistency in the current sample was 
α = .95. 
Memory Recall Test. Both prior to and following the manipulation (see below) 
participants were asked to write down everything they could recall from a vignette that was 
dictated earlier in the study. They were given five minutes to complete this task. 
Manipulation Check Questions. Both prior to and following the manipulation (see below) 
participants rated their anxiety, urge to neutralize their anxiety, and urge to wash their hands on a 
scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 100 (‘extremely’).  
Materials 
 A short vignette was created describing the experience of an individual completing a 
group project with two other students. Some of the information mentioned in the vignette relates 
to physical contact or exchange of items that have been touched (e.g., borrowing pens, shaking 
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hands), while other information is about the person’s life or appearance (e.g., number of siblings, 
type of shoes). The vignette includes details about these and other aspects for both students (e.g., 
the type of pen each student was using). The vignette is available upon request from the first 
author. 
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to close their eyes and imagine themselves as the individual in 
the vignette as the experimenter read the vignette aloud. Participants then responded to emotion 
state questions (see Measures), completed a distractor task, and finally a recall memory test. 
Participants were then informed that the experimenter had accidentally read an old version of the 
vignette and had thus forgotten to read the last sentence, at which time this sentence was 
provided. The content of this additional sentence depended on the condition to which the 
participant was randomly assigned (Threat or No-Threat). In the Threat condition participants 
were told that one of the students has a highly contagious flu. In the No-Threat condition 
participants were told that one of the students was just accepted to graduate school. For each 
participant one of the students in the vignette had additional information reported about them 
(the ‘manipulated’ individual), and no new information was provided about the other student (the 
‘un-manipulated’ individual). Which student became the manipulated individual was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 Following the manipulation, participants were asked to repeat the previously completed 
tasks (emotion state questions, distractor task, and a recall memory test). Finally, they completed 




 Information recalled from the vignette was coded as belonging to one of two categories: 
touched items (e.g., pens, Kleenex), or untouched items (e.g., program of study, number of 
siblings). Furthermore, information was categorized as being related to the individual who had 
added information about them provided (manipulated) or the individual for whom no new 
information was provided (un-manipulated). 
 The dependent variable of interest was calculated by dividing the number of items 
recalled at time 2 that were both touched and manipulated, by the total number of items recalled 
at time 2 (i.e., following the manipulation). This proportionate memory variable was selected 
because it provides valuable information about the variable of interest (items that were both 
touched and manipulated) while taking into account the limited capacity of memory (Miller, 
1956). 
Results 
 Participants. There were no significant condition differences on obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology, general anxiety, or depressive symptomatology. There were also no condition 
differences in overall memory performance at time 1 or time 2, or total memory recall. There 
was a significant decrease in memory over time across participants, t(95) = 2.47, p = .02, d = 
0.25. However, when changes in memory over time were investigated by condition, this decrease 
was significant in the Threat condition (t(48) = 2.65, p = .01, d = 0.38) but not in the No-Threat 
condition (t(46) = 0.72, p = .47, d = 0.11). 
Manipulation Check. Participants who were provided new threatening information about 
one of the individuals in the vignette were more anxious (t(94) = 4.24, p < .001, d = 0.86) and 
had stronger urges to neutralize their anxiety (t(94) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 0.68) and wash their 
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hands (t(94) = 9.88, p < .001, d = 2.03) than those who were provided with new neutral 
information. These condition differences were not evident prior to the manipulation (p’s > .05). 
Overall Analyses. An ANCOVA was conducted to assess the effects of condition on 
memory. The independent variable was condition, and the dependent variable was the proportion 
of items recalled at time 2 that were both manipulated and touched to the total number of items 
recalled at time 2. The covariate was this same proportionate memory variable calculated at time 
1 (proportion of items recalled at time 1 that were manipulated and touched to the total number 
of items recalled at time 1), to account for initial memory performance. Results showed a 
significant difference between conditions, F(1, 93) = 7.12, p = .01, adjusted r
2
 = .61, with 
individuals in the Threat condition showing a higher proportionate memory for items that were 
both manipulated and touched compared to all items recalled than those in the No-Threat 
condition (see Figure 1). At time 1 there was no difference between conditions on this 
proportionate memory variable, F(1, 94) = 0.00, p = .99, adjusted r
2
 = -.01. 
Discussion 
This study was designed to assess whether or not a memory bias could be created via 
informational means alone, thus assessing the distinct contribution of information in the absence 
of direct experience. Indeed, results showed that although no such bias was evident at encoding 
(when all of the to-be-recalled information was neutral in valence), following the manipulation, 
participants in the Threat condition showed a significant proportional memory bias in favour of 
threatening information (i.e., information relating to touched objects belonging to the individual 
described as having a highly contagious flu) compared to those in the No-Threat condition. 
These results are consistent with Senn and Radomsky (2012) who found a similar memory bias, 
although in the current study, a solely informational pathway was used rather than the 
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combination of both direct and informational pathways used in Senn and Radomsky (in which 
participants were shown a live tarantula which was described as having walked all over the to-
be-remembered objects). Given that the current results support an informational pathway in the 
development of memory bias, it is difficult to discern the potential unique importance of direct 
experience.  
The above findings are noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, the bias reflects an 
explicit memory bias. Although explicit memory biases for threat are arguably more commonly 
demonstrated under conditions high in ecological validity (Coles & Heimberg, 2002), there are 
many studies which have failed to show the presence of preferential recall (or recognition) of 
threat-relevant information. In addition, in the current study the observed memory bias 
presumably occurred in the absence of an attentional bias. (Although attention was not assessed, 
one assumes that participants could not have shown an attentional bias at encoding because none 
of the presented information was threatening in nature). This is also consistent with Senn and 
Radomsky (2012), and appears to show that the preferential allocation of attentional resources 
may not be necessary to foster better later memory. Future researchers may wish to confirm this 
via attentional assessment during a similar protocol.  
The memory bias demonstrated in the current study is also notable because there was no 
direct contact with any threatening stimulus (only new information about a character described in 
a previously listened-to vignette). Although the majority of studies have assessed memory for 
stimuli which were either threatening or non-threatening at encoding (e.g., Coles, Turk, & 
Heimberg, 2007; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999), only one other (to the best of our knowledge) 
has assessed memory for previously neutral information, later made threatening during the study 
(Senn & Radomsky, 2012). In this earlier study, the manipulation was effected using a live 
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tarantula, more in line with learning by direct experience. The current protocol employed stimuli 
(and a manipulation) which was/were informational only. As such, it establishes a more specific 
pathway toward the development of memory biases for threat (see Rachman, 1977). 
These results likely support prioritization of threat-relevant information in memory. 
Specifically, memory does not increase over time, but rather threat-relevant information is 
prioritized and thus preferentially recalled. False memory research also informs us that the 
original memory is not likely lost, but instead the new information has led to an integrated 
memory (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) in which threat information is more salient. 
Importantly, the results of the current study support enhanced memory for threat-relevant 
stimuli; however, this could also be due to the arousing nature of the information rather than the 
threat value itself. Indeed, it has been shown that arousing information (compared to non-
arousing information) is better remembered, regardless of its valence (Mather & Sutherland, 
2009). It is therefore possible that a similar effect would have been found if the information 
provided had been highly positive. 
The study is not without limitations. First, the actual time participants spent completing 
the memory task was not measured, so it is difficult to ascertain whether declarative memory was 
exhausted in the five-minute period provided. Additionally, demand characteristics may be a 
concern if participants realized the manipulation was part of the study. Although this was not 
formally evaluated, even if participants had predicted the exact nature of the study the effects 
would perhaps be balanced, as individuals in both conditions were provided with new 
information (that differed primarily in threat level). Moving forward, it would be fascinating to 
assess whether there is an observational (i.e., vicarious learning) pathway (see Mineka, 
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Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984; Rachman, 1977) to explicit memory bias, in addition to the direct 
and informational pathways now demonstrated. 
We hope that these results will influence the psychoeducation provided to patients/clients 
who complain of problems whose onset cannot be traced to a particularly difficult episode, but 
which could be related to the receipt of new threatening information about a previous neutral 
event. Similarly, clients may benefit from knowing that their memories may be skewed towards 
threat-related material, and this can help to explain why anxious individuals seem to have 





This work was supported in part by operating grant funding from the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada.  We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their 




Ashbaugh, A. R., & Radomsky, A. S. (2009). Interpretations of and memory for bodily  
sensations during public speaking. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental  
Psychiatry, 40, 399-411. 
Ashbaugh, A. R., & Radomsky, A. S. (2011). Memory for physiological feedback in social  
anxiety disorder: The role of fear of bodily sensations. Cognitive Therapy and Research,  
35, 304-316. 
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1990). Beck anxiety inventory manual. Toronto: Psychological 
Corporation. 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory-II.  
San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Blaut, A., Paulewicz, B., Szastok, M., Prochwicz, K., & Koster, E. (2013). Are attentional bias  
and memory bias for negative words causally related? Journal of Behavior Therapy and  
Experimental Psychiatry, 44, 293-299. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. 
Coles, M. E., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). Memory biases in the anxiety disorders: Current status.   
Clinical Psychology Review, 22, 587-627. 
Coles, M. E., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2007). Memory bias for threat in generalized  
anxiety disorder: The potential importance of stimulus relevance. Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy, 36, 65-73. 
Kovacs, M., & Beck, A. T. (1978). Maladaptive cognitive structures in depression. The  
American Journal of Psychiatry, 135, 525-533. 
Mansell, W., & Clark, D. M. (1999). How do I appear to others? Social anxiety and processing  
15 
 
of the observable self. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 419-434. 
Mather, M., & Sutherland, M (2009). Disentangling the effects of arousal and valence on  
memory for intrinsic details. Emotion Review, 1, 118-119. 
McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985). Misleading postevent information and memory for  
events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 114, 1-16. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity  
to process information. Psychological Review, 6, 81-97. 
Mineka, S., Davidson, M., Cook, M., & Keir, R. (1984). Observational conditioning of snake 
fear in rhesus monkeys. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93, 355-372.  
Mitte, K. (2008). Memory bias for threatening information in anxiety and anxiety disorders: A  
meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 886-911. 
Mogg, K., Mathews, A., & Weinman, J. (1987). Memory bias in clinical anxiety. Journal of  
Abnormal Psychology, 96, 94-98. 
Muller, J., & Roberts, J. E. (2005). Memory and attention in obsessive-compulsive disorder: A  
review. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19, 1-28. 
Rachman, S. (1977). The conditioning theory of fear-acquisition: A critical examination. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 15, 375-387. 
Radomsky, A. S., Ouimet, A. J., Ashbaugh, A. R., Lavoie, S. L., Parrish, C. L., & O’Connor, K. 
P. (2006). Psychometric properties of the French and English versions of the Vancouver 
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory and the Symmetry Ordering and Arranging 
Questionnaire. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 35, 164-173. 
16 
 
Radomsky, A. S., & Rachman, S. (1999). Memory bias in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 605-618. 
Radomsky, A. S., & Rachman, S. (2004). The importance of importance in OCD memory 
research. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 35, 137-151. 
Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., & Hammond, D. (2001). Memory bias, confidence and 
responsibility in compulsive checking. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 813-822. 
Senn, J. M., & Radomsky, A. S. (2012). Well that changes everything! The genesis of memory 
bias for threat with implications for delayed onset in anxiety disorders. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 1019-1025. 
Thordardson, D. S., Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R., Sawchuk, C. N., & Hakstian, A. 
R. (2004). The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI). Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 42, 1289-1314. 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., Amir, N., Street, G. P., & Foa, E. B. (2001).  
Memory and memory confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research  







Figure 1. Proportion of recalled items that were both manipulated and touched to total items 











Time 1 Time 2
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
to
u
ch
ed
 m
an
ip
u
la
te
d
 i
te
m
s 
to
 
to
ta
l 
it
em
s 
re
ca
ll
ed
 
Threat
No-Threat
